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Abstract
This paper presents a field workshop organised by the Healthcare Improvement Scotland (HIS) focusing on the evaluation 
of the formalised AcciMap approach by patient safety practitioners of the National Health Service (NHS). Participants who 
were experienced in incident analysis relating to patient safety and risk management across different NHS boards but had no 
prior knowledge using the AcciMap approach were recruited for a case study analysis (Wrong Patient) (Chassin and Becher 
in Ann Intern Med 136:826–833, 2002). They were subsequently divided into three teams after introduction and training, 
where each team performed an independent case analysis. AcciMap outcomes produced indicated both similar and varying 
contributing factors identified by each team. This was also reflected in their formulation of safety recommendations. Their 
findings were then compared with each other (reliability) and with external review (validity). Based on results obtained from 
the survey instrument distributed after the exercise and focus discussions, the AcciMap approach was generally perceived as 
intuitive and a potentially relevant toolkit for incident investigations. However, questions were raised particularly regarding 
the usability (ease of use) in conducting analyses compared RCA techniques.
Keywords AcciMap · Accident models · Systemic models · Patient safety · Risk management
1 Introduction
Conducting incident analysis in healthcare systems is crucial 
for promoting and improving patient safety (Johnson 2004). 
This requires identifying and reducing risks through the 
development and application of safety recommendations or 
preventive measures to prevent their re-occurrence (Salmon 
et al. 2012). However, in the current practice of incident 
investigations at the National Health Service (NHS), there 
has been a dependence on the use of Root Cause Analytical 
(RCA) techniques to determine contributing factors relating 
to the accident that occurred (Canham et al. 2018). While the 
concept of “systems thinking” has become a dominant para-
digm relating to understanding why adverse events occurred, 
approaches incorporating this paradigm have not been exten-
sively applied for incident investigations in healthcare sys-
tems. This is has led to the concept coined by Underwood 
and Waterson (2013) regarding the “research-practice” gap 
relating to the benefits of adopting this thinking not being 
practically implemented in clinical practice.
The AcciMap approach is considered an example of sys-
temic approaches (Salmon et al. 2010; Salmon et al. 2012) 
which was developed for graphically depicting multi-causal 
chains consisting of events, decisions and contributing fac-
tors (Svedung and Rasmussen 2002; Rasmussen and Sve-
dung 2000). While the AcciMap approach in addition to 
other systemic approaches like STAMP (Systems Theoretic 
Accident Modelling Process) (Leveson 2002; Leveson et al. 
2004; Qureshi 2008) and FRAM (Functional Resonance 
Accident Method) (Hollnagel 2004) provide different per-
spectives to how accidents are analysed, there has not been a 
prevalent adoption of these approaches despite their benefits 
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(Underwood and Waterson 2013). This version was devel-
oped by Branford (2007) based on existing versions of the 
original AcciMap (Rasmussen and Svedung 2000; Vicente 
and Christoffersen 2006) as a way of providing a consistent 
methodology for users in determining why the adverse event 
occurred (Branford 2011).
This paper discusses patient safety practitioners’ per-
ception of the application of a formalised version of the 
AcciMap approach (method) based on their findings using 
the model usage characteristic framework (Underwood 
and Waterson 2014). This framework focused on impor-
tant characteristics of an accident analytical approach 
including usability (ease of use), validity, reliability, and 
graphical representation of the accident (Underwood and 
Waterson 2014). It was initially utilised in a field study for 
evaluating practitioner’s perception of the application of the 
STAMP model (Underwood et al. 2016) and this is applica-
ble in gaining insight on their first-time application of the 
AcciMap approach. While there have been a few studies 
of the application of the AcciMap approach in the health 
domain (Waterson 2009; Woo and Vicente 2003; Vicente 
and Christoffersen 2006), there has not been any significant 
report of its application in NHS clinical practices. Although 
it is important to state that since this study, there has been 
a growing application of systemic approaches including the 
AcciMap approach in NHS practices. It is also being utilised 
with other systemic approaches at the National level most 
notably the Health Safety Investigation Branch (HSIB), a 
branch of the NHS recently established in 2017.
2  Rasmussen’ risk management framework 
(RMF)
Before briefly outlining the AcciMap approach, it is nec-
essary to establish the broader framework; the Risk Man-
agement Framework where it was derived from. The Risk 
Management Framework (RMF) developed by Rasmussen 
(1997) underpinned the notion of safety as an emergent char-
acteristic of complex sociotechnical systems. RMF is also “a 
prominent systems-theory based model for describing work 
systems composed of various labels, and argues that safety 
is impacted by the decisions and actions across all levels 
(e.g. politicians, chief executives, managers, supervisors), 
not just by those of front line operators alone” (see Fig. 1) 
(Donovan et al. 2015; Salmon et al. 2012; Waterson and 
Jenkins. 2011).
Each level of the Risk Management framework is con-
nected by a flow of information in a top–down approach 
from the external level to the frontlines (physical level) (Sve-
dung and Rasmussen 2002). This flow of information from 
the top denotes decisions taken by different external entities 
and then the state of the system is taken upwards helping 
to “inform decision making and action at higher levels” 
(Donovan et al. 2015). Interactions within and between these 
system levels also control the performance and safety of the 
system (Trotter et al. 2014; Waterson and Jenkins 2010). 
While the AcciMap approach is underpinned by this frame-
work (Salmon et al. 2010), additional tools also include 
Actor Maps, Conflict Maps and Info flow Maps (Waterson 
and Jenkins 2010).
3  The formalised AcciMap approach
AcciMap (Accident Mapping) is a retrospective accident 
analytical approach used for representing and analysing 
systemic failures (Rasmussen 1997). It can be utilised as 
either a standalone method or as a part of a broader Risk 
Management Framework (RMF) for the development of 
risk management strategies (Waterson and Jenkins 2010). 
This approach also describes or depicts decisions, actions 
or events within and between six levels consisting of Envi-
ronment, Actor Activities, Management, Company, Regula-
tions/Associations, and Government (Salmon et al. 2012; 
Hopkins 2000). Also, it allows analysts to graphically rep-
resent causal relationships (cause and effect) between iden-
tified causal/contributing factors within and between levels 
that led to the adverse outcome(s) (Branford 2007; Branford 
et al. 2009). As highlighted, the formalised version of the 
AcciMap was developed based on the original AcciMap 
template presenting a more simplified approach as depicted 
in Fig. 2.
The main difference between the original version and the 




























Fig. 1  Socio-technical model of system operations (Svedung and 
Rasmussen 2002)
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the former has six (6) levels of abstraction while the lat-
ter was reformatted into four (4) levels. The latter approach 
did not include “Equipment and Surrounding level” and 
both “Technical and operational management” and “com-
pany management & local area government” was merged as 
“organisational”. The external level of Branford’s approach 
includes the merging of “Regulatory bodies & Associations” 
and “Government policies”.
The AcciMap Methodology involves several steps in the 
analysis of both incidents and accidents in determining both 
proximal as well as system-wide failures. Several steps from 
the guidelines can be repeated until the final AcciMap out-
come is satisfactorily obtained. These procedures involve all 
the six levels in the AcciMap structure (Salmon et al. 2011):
(1) Collection of data relating to the accident/incident 
which involves activities, such as interviews, analysis 
of reports and observation recordings.
(2) Identifying failures relating to the accident from all 
the six levels; equipment and surroundings, actors and 
physical processes, technical and operational manage-
ment, local area government/company management, 
regulatory bodies and associations and government 
policy and budgeting.
(3) Identifying factors relating to the accident in step 2 and 
as well as factors relating to each of the levels.
(4) Identifying failures at other levels to determine the 
causal factors and consequences. These can be added 
to a “rough” diagram.
(5) Construction of the AcciMap diagram.
(6) Finalizing and reviewing the constructed AcciMap dia-
gram which may require several iterations to have a 
completed output.
The processes involved in analysing incidents using the 
formalised AcciMap approach (Branford et al. 2009) accord-
ing to the guidelines developed by Branford are essentially 
similar to the above steps regarding the general AcciMap 
construction include the following:
(1) Creating a blank AcciMap format on which to arrange 
the causes/contributing factors
(2) Identifying the adverse outcome of the incident
(3) Identifying contributing factors based on the incident 
report
(4) Identifying the appropriate AcciMap level for each con-
tributing factor identified
(5) Preparing the contributing factors representative of 
each AcciMap level
(6) Inserting causal links (relationships) to depict cause 
and effect between contributing factors
(7) Filling in the gaps left in the causal chains where infor-
mation is missing
(8) Checking the causal logic and making sense of the 
sequence of events
(9) Formulating safety recommendations that are practical 
and feasible
Fig. 2  Standardized AcciMap 
structure ( Adapted from Bran-
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4  Why the AcciMap approach?
Root Cause Analytical (RCA) techniques have been used 
as toolkits for investigating and analysing serious events in 
healthcare (Johnson 2004; Qureshi 2008). However, they 
have been noted to assume a linear approach regarding cause 
and effect to accident causation and so unsuitable when ana-
lysing incidents from a sociotechnical perspective (Canham 
et al. 2018; Qureshi 2008). These techniques are mainly 
focused on analysing errors at the front end of the spectrum 
and not considering in-depth system weaknesses and why 
they occurred. The AcciMap approach provides a means of 
analysing accidents in complex socio-technical systems and 
is cited as one of the most popular systemic approaches in 
the research domain (Underwood and Waterson 2013).
In terms of its application, the AcciMap approach is 
in a way similar to the use of the Five (5) Why technique 
when determining what happened. However, the AcciMap 
approach depicts multi-causal (cause and effect) linkages 
between causal/contributing factors (Branford et al. 2009). 
There has been a continued dependence on RCA techniques 
which do not incorporate the benefits of applying systems 
thinking in analysing accidents, why they occurred and pre-
venting their re-occurrence. The AcciMap approach provides 
this benefit of analysing existing weaknesses in systems as 
complex and socio-technical as healthcare which will enable 
users to develop safety recommendations to address these 
weaknesses.
5  Study aims
This paper focuses on patient safety practitioners’ perception 
of the use of Branford’s formalised AcciMap approach for 
incident/accident analysis. To achieve this, a formal work-
shop with participants across NHS boards was organised by 
the Healthcare Improvement Scotland (HIS). The objectives 
of this study include the following:
(1) Obtaining participants’ perception of the application 
of the formalised AcciMap approach in the analysis of 
the “Wrong Patient” case incident (Chassin and Becher 
2002).
(2) A qualitative evaluation of the AcciMap approach 
based on the usage characteristics criteria (Underwood 
and Waterson 2014).
(3) Exploring if there are benefits in using this approach as 
part of adverse event analysis for health and social care 
events
6  Research methodology
This study will involve a case study incident relating to 
“Wrong Patient” obtained from the Annals of Medicine jour-
nal (Chassin and Becher 2002). The incident was selected 
based on the nature of the type of error that occurred and 
noted by the authors. Using a qualitative case study approach 
as noted by Yin (1994), participants will then apply the for-
malised AcciMap approach to determine contributing factors 
identified and safety recommendations proposed. Partici-
pants were introduced and trained in the use of the AcciMap 
approach within the first hour. Participants were given two 
hours for the AcciMap analyses exercise. The following sec-
tions outline the study methodology.
6.1  Participants
A total of 15 participants took part in the AcciMap training 
workshop. Information and consent forms were given to the 
participants and filled out before the workshop. Participants 
who accepted the invitation composed of Eight (8) territorial 
(regional) NHS boards (out of a total of 14 across Scotland) 
and three (3) special NHS boards. Roles and responsibili-
ties of the participants across different these NHS boards in 
Scotland included Clinical governance, Risk management, 
and Health and Safety management (see Table 1). All partic-
ipants were experienced with the use of Root Cause Analysis 
(RCA) techniques, fishbone diagrams for incident analysis in 
their respective boards. Permission to use the approach and 
its guidelines were granted (Branford 2016) and the ethics 
approval for the workshop was obtained from the Healthcare 
Improvement Scotland (HIS).
6.2  Training/materials provided
Materials including the case study information and the 
AcciMap guidelines originally developed by Branford were 
distributed to the participants prior through the Healthcare 
Improvement Scotland (HIS). The materials were given to 
them prior to the commencement of the workshop through 
the HIS Senior Lead to enable them to familiarise them-
selves with the case study. On the day of the workshop, par-
ticipants were introduced to the AcciMap approach as part of 
the broader Risk Management Framework (RMF). Rasmus-
sen’s theory and the socio-technical structure describing the 
AcciMap approach was also highlighted and methodology 
of application within the first hour of the workshop. A case 
example of the application of the AcciMap approach was 
also described to the participants.
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6.3  Procedures
During the first section of the training, the foundation of 
the AcciMap approach was explained to the participants 
as well as a graphical representation of its application on 
an example incident. Participants were then subsequently 
divided into three groups of five each; teams A, B and C. 
The case study information given to them only contained the 
chronology (timeline) of events without any initial analyses 
and discussions from the original authors to avoid bias. Each 
team commenced their analysis of the case incident within 
the next two hours assigned for the exercise and each of 
the team’s discussions was separately audio recorded. Large 
papers and sticky notes were given to the teams to use to 
construct their AcciMap outcomes and safety recommenda-
tions were also developed within the time that was permit-
ted. After their analyses, the teams were then asked to review 
each other’s results before a final discussion. Questionnaires 
were then distributed to participants after the focus group 
discussions were completed to end the workshop.
7  Incident summary
The case report highlighted a type of medical error that 
occurred in a US-based hospital where the wrong patient 
underwent an invasive procedure (Chassin and Becher 2002; 
Johnson 2004). This incident was indicated to be very dis-
tressing and warranted attention. In addition, this type of 
error was also under-reported according to Chassin and 
Becher (2002). The scenario involved a 67-year-old patient 
who was admitted to the hospital for cerebral angiography 
but mistakenly underwent an invasive cardiac electrophysi-
ology procedure. A second patient, a 77-year-old patient was 
transferred from another hospital for a cardiac electrophysi-
ology procedure. Her procedure was delayed for two days 
and was intended to be the first case on the day of the first 
patient’s planned discharge from the hospital.
The full timeline of the chronology of events is summa-
rised in Table 2. This incident was reviewed and analysed 
using the institution’s root cause analysis where several dis-
tinct errors were discovered. According to the article, “no 
singular error” was identified which could have led to the 
adverse event itself (Chassin and Becher 2002).
This case incident was selected based on the above rea-
sons regarding the type of error and the location where 
it occurred. The case also contains a narrative timeline 
describing the activities that took place which also gives 
participants the opportunity of not only picturing the inci-
dent scenario but applying systems thinking concepts using 
Branford’s AcciMap guidelines. Discussions relating to 
the nature of the incident could prove to be insightful as 
this case was not something that any of the participants had 
experienced in their respective NHS boards.
8  Data collection and analysis
The data sources from the workshop consisted of audio 
recordings from each group designated as Team A, B and 
C as well as survey data on the evaluation of the AcciMap 
Table 1  List of participants involved in the AcciMap workshop
Participant Role/Responsibility Years of experi-
ence (as of 
2016)
1 Head of Clinical Governance and Risk Management Unknown
2 Senior Member, Healthcare Environmental Services Unknown
3 Corporate Risk Manager 15
4 Lead Clinical Risk Coordinator, Clinical Governance Support Unit 5
5 Head of Occupational Health & Safety 7
6 Risk Management Advisor (Patient Safety) Unknown
7 Clinical Risk Manager 10
8 Risk/Health & Safety Manager, Clinical Governance & Health & Safety team 7
9 Risk Manager, State Hospital 11
10 Head of Health and Safety 9
11 Risk Manager, Scottish Ambulance Service Unknown
12 Risk Management Service Support & Datix Systems Administrator Unknown
13 Risk & Safety Manager Unknown
14 Lead Clinical Risk Coordinator, Clinical Risk Management 5
15 Patient Safety Lead, Healthcare Improvement Scotland 4
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approach. The AcciMap outputs from each group were also 
collected including safety recommendations.
8.1  AcciMap analysis exercise
After the exercise, participants from each team reviewed 
and compared their findings with what other teams did in 
producing their outcomes. AcciMap results are compared 
and contrasted for similarities and differences in terms of 
contributing factors using content analysis as a qualitative 
reliability measurement (Branford 2007). Outcomes are also 
compared with external analysis of the case incident in terms 
of if similar contributing factors and safety recommenda-
tions were identified (validity assessment).
8.2  AcciMap survey questionnaire
The evaluation questionnaire used for the workshop was 
adapted from previous fieldwork utilizing another systemic 
accident model (STAMP) (Underwood et al. 2016). Data 
Table 2  Summary of events (Timeline) ( Adapted from Chassin and Becher 2002)
Time Event (s)
6:15 am. The electrophysiology nurse (RN1) logged into the laboratory computer to check on morning schedules, called in the 
Telemetry unit to request for the patient (Jane Morrison) but was incorrectly told that the patient was moved to the 
Oncology floor
6:20 am. RN called the Oncology floor (Joan Morris was transferred after her cerebral angiography) and was mistakenly notified 
that the patient was to be transferred to the electrophysiology laboratory)
6:30 am. The second nurse (RN2) agreed to transport the patient for the procedure but was informed about the plan by the charge 
nurse or Joan Morris’s nurse from the previous evening. RN2 also informed the patient that she could refuse the proce-
dure
6:45 a.m. The doctor spoke with the patient (Ms Morris) who was brought in by RN2. The patient expressed reluctance in undergo-
ing the procedure due to feeling nauseated and general unwellness. The doctor (the attending) was surprised due to hav-
ing met with the patient the night before. After speaking with the patient, intravenous prochlorperazine was administered 
to the patient to help reduce nausea
6:45 a.m.–7:00 a.m. RN1 noticed no consent indicated in the patient’s chart even though it was stated in the daily schedule that the consent was 
obtained. The nurse also paged the electrophysiology fellow regarding the procedure
7:00 a.m.–7:15 a.m. The electrophysiology fellow then reviewed the patient’s chart and was surprised regarding the lack of important informa-
tion. The fellow then discussed the nature of the procedure and the patient then signed the consent for the EP study with 
both possible ICD (Implantable cardiac defibrillator) and PM (Pacemaker) replacements
7:10 a.m. RN1 informed the electrophysiology charge nurse that an earlier patient had arrived without mentioning the patient’s name 
in the conversation
7:15 a.m.–7:30 a.m. RN3 proceeded to attach the devices including monitors on the patient while also explaining the procedure. The patient 
(Ms Morris) indicated fainting to the nurse who surmised it as a reason for the electrophysiology procedure
7:30 a.m. The resident (neurosurgery team) came in for morning rounds and discovered that the patient (Ms Morris) was not avail-
able in the room. The resident then learned about the procedure and enquired to know why it was the case. However, the 
patient’s name was not used. RN1 then informed the resident that the patient was being taken as the first case after being 
bumped twice. The resident then left assuming that the attending had ordered the EP study without his knowledge
8:00 a.m. RN4 (an additional nurse) and the electrophysiology attending arrived. The latter could not see the patient’s face at the 
computer console due to her head being draped. The procedure was then initiated by the fellow by inserting femoral 
sheaths and commencing the simulation of the heart via an intracardiac electrophysiology catheter
8:30 a.m.–8: 45 a.m. RN5 from the telemetry floor then telephoned the electrophysiology laboratory to enquire why the patient (Jane Morrison, 
who was actually the correct patient) was not called. After consultation with RN4 regarding the expected completion 
time for Joan Morris, RN5 was then advised to send Ms Morrison by 10 a.m.
8:30 a.m.–8: 45 a.m. The electrophysiology charge nurse took note of “Joan Morris” not matching any of the five names listed in the morning 
log. She queried the fellow regarding the patient names in the electrophysiology laboratory. However, due to the state of 
the procedure, further conversations did not occur as the charge nurse assumed that the patient (Joan Morris) had been 
added after the advanced schedule
9:00 a.m.–9: 15 a.m. An interventional radiology attending went into Ms Morris’ room and was surprised to find it empty. A call was then made 
to the electrophysiology laboratory to find out why the patient was undergoing the procedure. The electrophysiology 
attending indicated to the nurse that the call was in regard to the patient named Morris but instead Jane Morrison was 
currently on the table. However, the electrophysiology charge nurse corrected him that it was actually Jane Morris who 
was on the table. The attending (electrophysiology) then examined the patient’s chart and noticed the error
9:15 a.m.–9:30 a.m. The procedure was then aborted, and the patient was subsequently returned in a stable condition back to the oncology 
unit. The patient was then kept under observation and was discharged the following day. The error detected was also 
explained to the patient and the family. Outpatient neurosurgical follow-up was then arranged for the patient and surgery 
was also scheduled for her aneurysm
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collected from the survey were analysed using Microsoft 
Excel and R, a statistical software. The questionnaire con-
sisted of twenty-two (22) questions relating to important 
aspects of an accident analytical approach including usabil-
ity and validity. These aspects were also used to evaluate the 
STAMP approach in a small investigation study with safety 
practitioners in the Railway domain. The questionnaire was 
distributed to the participants after the analysis exercise was 
completed.
8.3  Audio recordings
Audio recordings collected from each team during their 
analyses and final group discussions were manually tran-
scribed to determine themes relating to contributing factors 
identified. During the final group discussion, their experi-
ence regarding the application of the AcciMap approach, 
advantages, limitations, and how it can be further improved 
as a tool for incident analysis were also recorded and manu-
ally transcribed.
9  Findings from the workshop
Findings based on the survey instrument and the respective 
AcciMap results from the participants’ analysis of the case 
study are divided into the following sections:
9.1  Analysis of the AcciMap evaluation survey
Thirteen (13) out of fifteen (15) participants completed the 
survey after their analyses. However, there missing gaps 
(2) based on questions 13 and 20 filled by two participants. 
Based on the first three survey questions (see Tables 3 and 
4), ten (10) participants were familiar with the concept of 
“systems thinking” before the workshop (76.9%) but out of 
the ten (10) participants, only three (3) of them were vaguely 
familiar with the AcciMap approach.
Three groups were generated based on questions 1 and 2 
as indicated below:
Group 1: Familiar with “systems thinking” and unaware 
of the AcciMap approach (7 respondents);
Group 2: Unfamiliar with “systems thinking” and una-
ware of the AcciMap approach (3 respondents);
Group 3: Familiar with “systems thinking” and aware of 
the AcciMap approach (3 respondents).
The levels of satisfaction regarding the AcciMap 
approach appear to be different between each group iden-
tified (see Fig. 3). In addition, group 1 indicated the best 
level of satisfaction on the use of the AcciMap approach. An 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) analysis was also performed 
to gain insight into the differences in satisfaction from three 
groups regarding the knowledge of systems thinking and 
their awareness of the AcciMap approach. The results indi-
cated in Table 4 suggests that there is no evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis and hence no evidence of any differences 
amongst the groups.
Table 3  Question_One Were you familiar with systems thinking?
Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumu-
lative 
percent
No 3 23.1 23.1 23.1
Yes 10 76.9 76.9 100.0
Total 13 100.0 100.0
Table 4  Question_Two Were you aware of the AcciMap method?
Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumu-
lative 
percent
No 10 76.9 76.9 76.9
Yes 3 23.1 23.1 100.0
Total 13 100.0 100.0
Fig. 3  Density of the three groups relating to questions 1 and 2
Table 5  ANOVA for three groups
Analysis of variance table
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value p value
Group 2 1.488 0.74406 0.7531 0.4718
Residuals 296 292.456 0.98803
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The summary of descriptive statistics based on questions 
4 to 22 (see Table 5) where mean and standard deviation 
values from the survey data are indicated. Minimum and 
maximum values represent the lowest and highest values on 
the Likert scale (from “strongly disagree” (0) to “strongly 
agree” (6)) used to rate each question (see Appendix A). 
Based on the exploratory analysis of the responses, par-
ticipants generally considered the AcciMap approach to 
be a suitable approach for analysing accidents (Question 
4). There was also a favourable agreement regarding the 
method’s ability to represent causal relationships between 
different levels (Question 8) and as well as promoting col-
laboration (Question 17). Question 6 focused on the effectiveness of the Acci-
Map approach in identifying contributing factors based on 
Table 6  Descriptive statistics (Questions 4 to 22) (Igene et al. 2017)
Question N Min Max Mean SD
4.) AcciMap is a suitable method for analysing accidents 13 3 6 3.92 0.862
5.) AcciMap effectively describes the timeline of events leading to the accident 13 0 3 2.23 1.013
6 a.) AcciMap effectively analyses the contributing factors to an accident from Technical components 13 3 5 3.62 0.650
6 b.) AcciMap effectively analyses the contributing factors to an accident from Human factor issues 13 2 5 3.54 0.776
6 c.) AcciMap effectively analyses the contributing factors to an accident from Organisational issues 13 3 5 3.77 0.725
6 d.) AcciMap effectively analyses the contributing factors to an accident from Environmental issues 13 3 5 3.54 0.660
6 e.) AcciMap effectively analyses the contributing factors to an accident from External issues 13 0 5 3.54 1.198
7.) AcciMap provides a comprehensive description of an accident 13 1 6 3.62 1.261
8.) AcciMap effectively represents causal relationships between each levels 13 3 6 4.38 0.870
9.) AcciMap accurately identifies the causes of an accident 13 3 6 4.23 0.832
10.) AcciMap can be applied to analyse any type of accident in NHS boards 13 2 6 3.54 1.266
11.) AcciMap is an easy method to understand 13 3 6 3.85 0.987
12.) The terms and concepts used in the AcciMap method are clear and unambiguous 13 3 5 3.77 0.725
13.) It is easy to identify contributing factors that led to the accident 12 3 5 3.83 0.718
14.) It is easy to identify unsafe decisions that led to the accident 13 2 5 3.62 0.768
15.) AcciMap is an easy method to use for accident analysis 13 3 6 3.85 0.987
16.) AcciMap is easy to use in a team-based analysis 13 3 5 3.92 0.641
17.) AcciMap promotes team collaboration during analysis 13 2 5 4.08 1.115
18.) AcciMap’s graphical diagram is a useful communication tool 13 2 5 4.38 0.870
19.) It would be easy for me to become skilled at using AcciMap method 13 3 6 4.15 0.987
20.) AcciMap analysis can be completed in an acceptable timescale (within a few hours of the workshop) 12 3 5 3.75 0.754
21.) AcciMap method is time-consuming 13 1 5 3.08 1.038
22.) I received sufficient introductory training in the use of the AcciMap method to effectively use this method 13 1 4 3.00 0.913
Table 7  AcciMap effectively analyses the contributing factors to an 
accident from Technical components (Question 6a)
Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumu-
lative 
percent
Neutral 6 46.2 46.2 46.2
Slightly agree 6 46.2 46.2 92.3
Agree 1 7.7 7.7 100.0
Total 13 100.0 100.0
Table 8  AcciMap effectively analyses the contributing factors to an 
accident from Human factor issues (Question 6b)
Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumu-
lative 
percent
Slightly disagree 1 7.7 7.7 7.7
Neutral 5 38.5 38.5 46.2
Slightly agree 6 46.2 46.2 92.3
Agree 1 7.7 7.7 100.0
Total 13 100.0 100.0
Table 9  AcciMap effectively analyses the contributing factors to an 
accident from Organisational issues (Question 6c)
Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumu-
lative 
percent
Neutral 5 38.5 38.5 38.5
Slightly agree 6 46.2 46.2 84.6
Agree 2 15.4 15.4 100.0
Total 13 100.0 100.0
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technical components, human factors, organisational, envi-
ronmental and external issues (see Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 
11). However, participants’ responses indicated a consider-
able amount of neutral responses particularly for question 
6a–e.
There was a significant amount of neutral responses 
regarding the questions relating to the effectiveness of 
the AcciMap approach when analysing contributing fac-
tors. Reasons for this could be attributed to their very 
first attempt at applying the AcciMap approach using the 
guidelines, understanding of the incident and lack of sub-
stantial evidence at both organisational and external levels. 
For example, one of the factors at the organisational level; 
“electrophysiology laboratory computer not in sync with the 
hospital’s main computer system” contributed to the patient 
subsequently not being properly identified by the medical 
staff. However, further investigation will need to be carried 
out to ascertain why that is the case and parties responsible 
would include the technical/IT department and hospital man-
agement. Other organisational factors not based on explicit 
evidence but could be deduced based on actions of medical 
staff include how they interacted with the patient (obtain-
ing consent), misidentification of the patient and inadequate 
communication with other staff (not using the full name of 
the patient).
There were also mixed responses from participants 
regarding the application of the AcciMap approach being a 
time-consuming process and the sufficiency of the training 
for effective use (Question 21 and 22). Other aspects of the 
AcciMap approach regarding its ability to identify unsafe 
decisions (question 14) and terms and concepts being clear 
(question 12) also indicated mixed responses including posi-
tive and neutral responses. This may have been influenced 
by their level of satisfaction regarding the sufficiency of the 
AcciMap training (question 22) conducted by the beginning 
of the workshop. The overall satisfaction regarding the use 
of the AcciMap as shown in Fig. 4 shows the density line 
skewing to the right indicating a considerably more than 
average probability of satisfaction. It should be noted that 
the results only reflected responses from thirteen participants 
from the initial fifteen that were involved in the exercise. The 
remaining two participants left during the focus group dis-
cussions and so their responses were not taken into account.
9.2  AcciMap results
The AcciMap outputs produced by each team A (Fig. 5), B 
(Fig. 6) and C (Fig. 7) based on initial observation showed 
similarities and differences in contributing factors identified. 
Each AcciMap output and safety recommendations were 
compared with one another and also compared with findings 
obtained from external (expert) review of the case incident. 
Contributing factors identified that were based on evidence 
are denoted as regular boxes while factors that are consid-
ered inferences are denoted as broken boxes. A qualitative 
reliability and validity assessment of outcomes produced by 
participants from their respective teams was carried out and 
will serve as part of the discussion section.  
Based on themes regarding contributing factors identified 
by each team, similar factors were commonly identified but 
expressed using different wordings. Their respective find-
ings relating to contributing factors identified are discussed 
below:
Table 10  AcciMap effectively analyses the contributing factors to an 
accident from Environmental issues (Question 6d)
Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumu-
lative 
percent
Neutral 7 53.8 53.8 53.8
Slightly agree 5 38.5 38.5 92.3
Agree 1 7.7 7.7 100.0
Total 13 100.0 100.0
Table 11  AcciMap effectively analyses the contributing factors to an 
accident from External issues (Question 6e)
Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumu-
lative 
percent
Strongly disagree 1 7.7 7.7 7.7
Neutral 3 23.1 23.1 30.8
Slightly agree 8 61.5 61.5 92.3
Agree 1 7.7 7.7 100.0
Total 13 100.0 100.0
Fig. 4  Histogram of the survey data from participants
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Fig. 5  Team A—AcciMap output of case study
Fig. 6  Team B—AcciMap output of case study
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9.2.1  Contributing factor: hospital’s computing systems
The contributing factor relating to the electrophysiology 
laboratory system was also identified by all and denoted as 
“incompatibility of IT systems” (Team A), “Electrophysiol-
ogy system and hospital’s main computer not communicat-
ing with one another” (Team B) and “separate computer 
systems not communicating with one another” (Team C). 
Team B regarded issues relating to technology (Computer 
systems) not communicating with the one another (Hospi-
tal’s main computer system) and how this contributed to the 
patient being misidentified (“Morrison” being confused with 
“Morris”). Team C also indicated issues relating to comput-
ing systems not communicating with each other leading to 
patient’s identity not being confirmed before the procedure 
was to commence.
9.2.2  Contributing factor: patient misidentification 
and communication issues
Contributing factors identified by Team C attributed to 
issues relating to “patient identification” and “patient being 
ignored by the physician”. These were as a result of com-
munication issues relating to identifying the correct patient 
(staff not verifying the identity of the patient e.g. using the 
date of birth). One of the participants (Team C) pointed out 
this factor based on personal experience in reference to a 
patient (ward):
“Every time the ward was handed over, they read the 
ward’s date of birth”.
This would be considered a barrier against misiden-
tification ensuring that the patient being examined is the 
right one. They further reasoned that failures exist when 
it comes to identifying names of patients even when two 
patients may be in completely different hospital areas and 
the barriers that should be in place to prevent it. Team B 
also identified the issue of human error relating to patient 
identification. Regarding the patient being ignored by the 
physician, participants from Team B reasoned that this was 
as a result of other factors including “pressures of waiting 
time” or “inadequate training”. There were no indications 
among Team A participants regarding communication issues 
but they indicated different staff (operations) failing to cor-
rectly identify the patient, similar to Teams B and C.
9.2.3  Contributing factor: patient’s uninformed consent
One of the contributing factors while differently worded car-
ried the same meaning and identified by teams A and B was 
the patient giving an uninformed consent. Team A’s analysis, 
for example, depicted this contributing factor as “lack of 
Fig. 7  Team C—AcciMap output of case study
 Cognition, Technology & Work
1 3
informed consent” to which one of the participants noted an 
issue of consent relating to the patient:
“lacks the whole human factors elements to it; over-
burdened and exhausted physicians, they do not know 
the patients, they don’t know if they actually spoke 
about what the procedure is”
Another participant (Team A) supported this as a contrib-
uting factor and explained further that:
“Patients cannot frequently recall within hours of giv-
ing crucial information. But if we know that, why was 
it not getting spoken about earlier”
Their observations would explain their reasoning on the 
mix-up regarding the patient giving a consent where she 
consented but was not properly informed about the type 
of procedure she was going to undergo. The fact that the 
patient also experienced nauseating symptoms created a 
situation where assumptions were made about her condi-
tion leading to the belief that she was indeed supposed to 
undergo such procedure. The participants also appeared 
to acknowledge that the issue of consent regularly occurs 
in health practice although it was not explicitly stated in 
the case incident. Team B participants similarly identified 
“patient giving an uninformed consent” as elaborated by one 
of the participants:
“I assume that in most healthcare establishments, 
when a patient says no I do not want that (procedure), 
it happens, they pause and will not continue with the 
surgical operation”
The concept of “surgical pause” was considered a con-
tributing factor but the question noted was if this was suf-
ficient for the event to take place. Another participant even 
considered this as one of the holes in the Swiss Cheese! 
This was also shared by another participant who indicated 
the need for absolute clarity regarding the “pause” in the 
process and to look for certain indicators to get a green light 
as for whether to proceed with double-checking if it is the 
right patient for the procedure. This also includes the need 
for double-checking the consent form, getting the paperwork 
right, checking if the patient understands the procedure and 
evaluating whether it is safe to carry out the operation. If 
these indicators are not present, then the procedure should 
not even progress. In other words, the team determined that 
there were huge margins of failure in the system. However, 
Team C did not include this contributing factor explicitly but 
seemed to suggest from the factor “staff not listening to the 
patient and was not in agreement” that there was an issue 
with consent because the preceding cause leading to that 
effect was that there were “inadequate policies regarding 
patient consent” (organisational factor).
9.2.4  Contributing factor: organisational issues
While participants were allowed to make inferences on con-
tributing factors at the organisational level, they also identi-
fied factors based on the information available in the case 
study. For example, Team A identified contributing factor 
“tolerance of lack of systemic identity checks” as a safety 
cultural issue relating to the hospital’s failure to conduct 
patient identity checks at different instances (at the physical 
level). Although, this was noted as an assumption and not 
necessarily a fact. Team B identified “Management compla-
cency” as an organisational issue and their reasoning behind 
this factor was highlighted by one of the participants (Team 
B):
“Allowing the staff to take unilateral decisions when 
they shouldn’t as long as nothing goes wrong, then 
they are quite happy for that to let it go on”
Several other organisational contributing factors were 
identified by Team C including “Staff not challenging” was 
causally linked to another factor at the physical level (“study 
arranged despite no written order”). Only Team C had con-
tributing factors including “lack of safety culture”, “lack of 
clinical governance” were identified as inferences rather than 
actual factors. They considered these factors to be reasons 
that contributed to the organisational culture of developing 
shortcuts and workarounds.
9.2.5  Contributing factors: external issues
No contributing factor based on evidence in the case study 
was identified by any of the teams for the external level but 
inferences were made. These inferences made by each team 
Table 12  Contributing factors (Inferences) based on the Case study (Teams A, B, & C)
Team A Team B Team C
1.) Lack of consistency regarding E-health tech-
nologies
2.) Improving hospital standards
3.) Legal implications of informed consent
4.) Issues relating to record-keeping and code of 
practice
1.) Waiting lists and targets from govern-
ment
2.) Budgeting issues and cost cuttings
3.) Set targets delivered to the organisation
1.) Issues regarding boarding from another 
hospital
2.) Demand demographics
3.) Waiting times and targets
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can be summarised based on their AcciMap outcomes in 
Table 12 below:
Reasonings behind each team’s decision to include these 
contributing factors were not openly discussed in their analy-
ses but it does indicate differences based on their perception 
and understanding regarding possible systemic factors that 
created the climate for the series of events to occur.
It was observed during the exercise that some of the par-
ticipants employed human factors thinking as well as tradi-
tional techniques, such as the 5-Whys and barrier analysis, 
based on their investigation experiences. Comparing the 
AcciMap outcomes by placing immediate causes after the 
incident at the “Physical Actors and Processes” level, we 
noticed similar events from the teams (particularly from 
Teams B and C). However, the causal linkages constructed 
by each team appeared to show differences. These will be 
discussed further in the following section of comparative 
analysis of results.
9.3  Comparison of AcciMap results
Each AcciMap result produced by respective teams was 
compared to assess the reliability (consistency) of outcomes 
produced. Based on the qualitative evaluation approach 
adopted by Branford (2007), the following criteria were used 
to evaluate the results:
(1) Identification of causes/contributing factors at each 
level
(2) Placement of causes/contributing factors at each level
(3) Causal links (relationships) within and between each 
level
While it was not expected that each team would produce 
exactly the same output, the purpose was to determine if 
similar factors were identified, the level they were placed 
and if similar causal links between them can be identified. 
Also, wordings used to describe events (contributing factors) 
were not expected to be identical as long as they portrayed 
similar meanings.
9.3.1  Identification of causes/contributing factors
9.3.1.1 Physical actor events, process and  conditions At 
the physical/actor events level, Team A identified three (3) 
factors, Team B identified thirteen (13) and Team C identi-
fied seven (7) factors. The only common factor identified by 
all teams was the contributing factor relating to patient iden-
tification. Other contributing factors identified at this level 
between Teams B and C include the patient’s wishes being 
ignored by medical personnel and assumptions relating to a 
written order. Contributing factors distinctly identified by 
each team are summarised in Table 13.
9.3.1.2 Organisational At this level, Team A identified 
eight (8) causes/contributing factors, Team B identified 
seven (7) and Team C identified eight (8) although out of 
that number, four (4) indicated as “assumptions  or infer-
ences”. Similar contributing factors identified between 
different teams included issues relating to communication 
between computer systems (Teams B and C), staff not chal-
lenging authority and deficient handover processes (Teams 
A and C). Although the last factor was denoted as inference 
by Team C rather than as a valid contributing factor.
9.3.1.3 External The case did not contain explicit evidence 
as to contributing factors, but the ones (inferences) identi-
fied by respective teams included issues relating to “legal 
implications regarding informed consent” (Team A), “wait-
ing times and targets” (Team C) and “budgeting issues” 
(Team B). These were all identified as inferences.
9.3.2  Placement of causes/contributing factors
Identification and placement of causes/contributing factors 
at the appropriate level are very important in addressing 
areas of the system that needs to be improved through safety 
measures (Branford 2007). Contributing factors attributed 
to patient misidentification, miscommunication with the 
patient, patient giving uninformed consent and assumptions 
between various staff were all placed the appropriate level 
(physical actors’ level). Another factor; lack of communi-
cation between computer systems particularly between the 
main hospital and the electrophysiology unit was appropri-
ately placed at the organisational level by Teams A and C. 
Table 13  Contributing factors distinctly identified by each Team (A, B and C) (Physical Level)
Team A Team B Team C
1.) IV prescription given over the 
phone
1.) Patient nauseated and not feeling well while giv-
ing consent
2.) Electro lab did not recognise the patient from the 
night before and did not the patiet’s relunctance
3.) Patient not being recognised by the attending in 
the electrophysiology lab the night before
1.) Patient delayed for two days
2.) End of shift (the team did not provide context 
for this factor)
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However, Team B had placed that particular contributing 
factor at the “Physical level” instead of at the organisational 
level as this will be considered to be within the control of 
the hospital organisation. Contributing factors identified by 
respective teams at the organisational and external levels 
while varied were appropriately placed.
9.3.3  Causal links within and between AcciMap levels
This criterion is perhaps the most challenging when com-
paring causal linkages between the causes/contributing fac-
tors identified from all teams AcciMap outcomes. Team B’s 
outcome had the most causal links (31), with team A having 
fifteen (15) and team C having twenty-one (21) links. Based 
on all causal relationships depicted by all teams, the only 
causal relationship that was similar was in respect to patient 
misidentification leading to the effect of the wrong patient 
being administered a procedure (Teams A, B, and C). Other 
causal relationships at the physical level that were similarly 
identified between different teams include:
The linkage (direct and indirect) between “Patient giv-
ing uninformed consent” and “Patient receiving a wrong 
procedure”—Teams A and B
The linkage (direct) between “Wishes of patient ignored” 
and “Patient being given an EP procedure”—Teams B 
and C
The linkage (direct and indirect) between “Staff not chal-
lenging/questioning authority” and “Patient being given 
a wrong procedure”—Teams A and C
At the organisational level, linkages identified by teams 
included more differences in terms of cause and effect. The 
only link that seemed to be similar between Teams B and 
C was between patient computer systems (electrophysiol-
ogy lab and main hospital) not communicating and patient 
identification issues by different staff. Although for Team A, 
there was a direct link between computer system communi-
cation issues and the patient receiving a wrong procedure. 
There were no similar links identified between the external 
and organisational levels.
10  Discussion
10.1  Application of the AcciMap approach
Despite neutral responses to some of the questions in the 
survey, participants generally indicated an understanding 
and considered the AcciMap approach suitable for inci-
dent analysis. However, participants also shared and dis-
cussed recommendations from the retrospective analysis to 
identify similarities. Regarding the mapping of the causal 
relationships between each level of the AcciMap, one par-
ticipant noted some difficulty in understanding the role of 
‘actors’ at the external level in contributing to the accident. 
The participant questioned the benefit of analysing systemic 
factors at the external level especially in regard to if recom-
mendations developed will improve system safety. Though 
this point was not supported by another participant in Team 
C who believed that by analysing the external level, one can 
determine possible latent conditions/weaknesses that ena-
bled such an event to occur. Organisational culture and inad-
equate systems were generally considered issues from the 
incident particularly from team C. One of the participants 
noted that while this incident is only a “window”, believed 
that the next step an organisation needs to take is to deter-
mine if this is a systemic issue.
One of the participants (Team A) opined that it would 
have been preferable to implement the use of the AcciMap 
approach in their organization’s clinical incident scenarios. 
This point highlights the need for further investigation into 
the suitability of the AcciMap approach as a tool for clinical 
investigation in NHS boards. Two participants had previous 
knowledge on the use of a cause and effect template based 
on another type of systemic accident approach; ATSB (Aus-
tralian Transport Safety Bureau) which was adopted in their 
NHS practice. Their experience in using this approach may 
have contributed to how they approached their analyses in 
their respective teams. Some participants utilised their expe-
riences by applying RCA techniques like barrier analysis and 
5-why(s)  in determining contributing factors. However, this 
was not considered a limitation in their respective analysis 
of the incident.
10.2  Method usage characteristics
Based on each team’s respective outcomes and survey 
results, their perception of the AcciMap approach is dis-
cussed based on the usage characteristics framework (Under-
wood and Waterson 2014).
10.2.1  Graphical representation of the accident
During discussions, participants generally agreed that the 
use of the AcciMap approach as a graphical tool can poten-
tially help investigators to depict and identify specific prob-
lem areas that compromise patient safety. From the survey 
result, a high percentage of participants either “agreed” or 
“slightly agreed” that the graphical representation of the 
accident can serve as a useful means of communication 
(question 18). Only one participant slightly disagreed with 
this point. Another participant noted that the mapping of 
contributing factors provides a helpful way of promoting 
discussions with higher management. However, another 
participant indicated that AcciMap diagrams can become 
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too complex unless contributing factors i.e. communication, 
staff competence are grouped under a higher hierarchy. In 
terms of representing the timeline of events as specified in 
the case study, participants (6) generally disagreed regarding 
diagrammatically denoting timelines of the events while the 
remaining participants were neutral in their response.
10.2.2  Data requirements
One of the participants commented on the nature of the case 
study and believed this incident was not something they 
experienced in their practice. The quality of the case study 
can also play a crucial role in how each of the teams inter-
preted the information of the events that led to the patient 
being given the wrong procedure. While the participants 
were guided using the table of contributing factors, they gen-
erally had varying views regarding systemic factors (organi-
sational and external levels) that contributed to the adverse 
event. From the outcomes, there was an indication that they 
had challenges in determining systemic factors at those lev-
els (organisational and especially at the external level).
10.2.3  Usability/ease of learning
The results from the survey data indicated that participants 
[slightly agreed (4), Agreed (2), and Strongly Agreed (1)] 
found the approach easy to use (question 16). The remaining 
participants (6) provided neutral responses. There were also 
neutral responses regarding how easy it was in understand-
ing the AcciMap approach, and if it can be used for accident 
investigations in their NHS boards (questions 11 and 10). 
Participants collectively agreed that like any analytical tools, 
understanding and using the approach effectively depends on 
the skills, knowledge, and experiences gained from previ-
ous investigations. This also highly suggests that more time 
invested in training will be needed to effectively use the 
AcciMap approach. This last point was particularly empha-
sised by one of the participants during the workshop. Dur-
ing the exercise, the participants generally did not indicate 
difficulty in following guidelines regarding the placement 
of contributing factors in the appropriate AcciMap levels. 
However, it seemed the challenging aspect of the exercise 
was in the mapping of logical casual connections between 
each of the levels. Based on question 15 of the survey, their 
responses were mixed but from the subsequent discussion, 
some of them indicated the use of the AcciMap approach to 
be time-consuming even though they completed their analy-
ses within the time frame for the exercise. 
10.2.4  Reliability of analysis
Based on observation of AcciMap outcomes produced, 
contributing factors identified at the physical actor process 
level appear to be more consistent between teams than fac-
tors identified at the organisational level. Contributing fac-
tor relating to scenarios where patient’s identity was not 
confirmed by different medical personnel was encapsulated 
as a single contributing factor “operation(s) failed to posi-
tively identify patient” by Team A. This was also applied to 
another factor identified by Team A; “operations making 
“assumptions” given the current information available”. 
Teams A, B and C identified factors relating to the misiden-
tification of the patient but only factors relating to “patient’s 
wishes being ignored” and “staff did not listen to the patient 
and was not in agreement” were similarly identified by both 
Teams B and C. Other contributing factors that was iden-
tified by at least two teams related to “Computer systems 
(between Electrophysiology and Main Hospital) not com-
municating” (Teams B and C) and “Inadequate handover 
processes/procedures” (Teams A and B). Other organisa-
tional factors identified were related to staff members not 
challenging hierarchy (Teams A and C) and patient consent 
issues (Teams A and B).
10.2.5  Validity of analysis
Contributing factors identified from each team’s respec-
tive AcciMap output were compared to the AcciMap out-
put independently produced based on an external review of 
the incident as shown in Fig. 8. Similar contributing fac-
tors at the physical and organisational levels were identified 
between all teams and external review as a form of face 
validity. However, a contributing factor that may be identi-
fied between the teams and experts’ analysis may not be con-
sidered a valid factor especially since using expert review 
serves as the next best alternative in the absence of a gold 
standard measurement (Branford 2007). Participants slightly 
agreed that the AcciMap approach was effective in analys-
ing contributing factors relating to technical components, 
human factors, organisational and environmental issues. 
However, concerning external factors, there seemed to be 
a contradiction between the survey result and their Acci-
Map outputs. This can be attributed to the lack of substantial 
information regarding external systemic factors. The number 
of neutral responses regarding sub-questions (6a to 6e) could 
be attributed to several factors including their first use of 
the approach in analysing this type of incident. In addition, 
being first-time users, the participants will need to review 
their analysis as they gain more understanding of the issues 
relating to why this kind of failure occurred. Regarding the 
AcciMap’s suitability for analysing accidents, there was a 
general agreement amongst the participants with only two 
of them being neutral. This observation corroborates with 
group discussions regarding developing causal connections 
when linking an adverse event(s) to the causes associated 
with it. It was further noted and agreed with the participants 
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of the need for further training and understanding of the 
approach to improve their skills. This will be an important 
process to be able to improve content and face validity.
10.3  Focus group discussions
The concluding part of the workshop was spent discuss-
ing their opinion on the benefits of applying the AcciMap 
approach based on their first-time experience. Participants 
were generally in agreement that the AcciMap approach was 
relatively easy to understand and use for incident analysis. 
Although, several participants expressed the need for more 
time to fully understand the case study and more training to 
fully implement the method. In terms of the advantages of 
the AcciMap method, one participant remarked:
“You can see relationships between various factors at 
various levels”
One participant (Team C) opined that in addition to the 
contributing factors table listed in the AcciMap training 
manual, other potential contributing factors identified need 
to be grouped similar to how the fishbone technique is used 
to identify and classify factors into different categories. 
Another participant (Team B) also supported this point and 
further believed that the process will require brainstorming 
regarding contributory factors and mapping them using the 
AcciMap approach. However, one of the demerits noted by 
another participant was the issue of the approach not hav-
ing timelines and in particular the non-inclusion of barrier 
analysis. While it was explained to them that the case study 
had a timeline of events that happened, a participant (Team 
A) further explained:
“I suppose we struggled a little bit because that’s get-
ting you to your contributing factors but not to your 
barriers”.
This point particularly focused on whether the consent 
policy existed or whether it was not followed and that if 
it was the former, then it would have been considered as a 
missing barrier. Participants generally agreed regarding the 
subjectivity of the outcomes and the need to improve its 
reliability after they had reviewed their outcomes. There was 
also a general consensus regarding the AcciMap approach 
being utilised as a potential toolkit for accident investiga-
tions in NHS practices. However, several participants indi-
cated that the approach can only be considered part of a tool-
box in conjunction with existing traditional RCA techniques, 
such as timelines and the fishbone technique.
10.4  Comparing safety recommendations
Based on safety recommendations produced by each team, 
there were few similarities and varying measures based 
on respective analyses (see Table 14). This is particularly 
Fig. 8  AcciMap output of case incident—expert review
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evident where each team developed its safety recommen-
dations based on step 9 from Branford’s AcciMap guide-
lines. Similarities from recommendations produced include 
implementation of safety briefs (Teams A and C), reviewing 
of processes relating to consent policy (Teams B and C) 
and reviewing of existing systems (Computer) (Team A and 
B). These recommendations relate to contributing factors 
including handover processes, communication relating to 
computer systems and patient consent policies.
Comparing each team’s safety recommendations with 
those produced from external analysis (see Table 15) shows 
similar outcomes relating to patient consent policies and 
reviewing computing systems in terms of synchronising 
with each other with updated patient information. However, 
other recommendations not indicated by respective teams 
include organisational safety culture in regard to challenging 
hierarchy when reporting concerns and reviewing of policies 
and training regarding patient identification.
11  Limitations of the study
Conducting training and evaluation of the formalised Acci-
Map approach with NHS participants had its challenges. The 
length of time assigned for the workshop particularly for the 
analysis exercise was not ideally sufficient for the analysis of 
the case incident. Despite the case information being given 
provided for the participants before the workshop, they still 
needed to refer to aspects of the report and this affected 
the time allocated to not only complete their analyses but 
also review where necessary. While this study did not focus 
on the amount of time it took for teams to complete their 
analyses, it is worth noting that this could have an impact 
on the consistency and validity of their respective outcomes. 
This was very much reflected in the survey result regard-
ing completion of analysis within designated time (question 
20) and if the approach is time-consuming (question 21). If 
more time was allocated, it would have allowed each team 
Table 14  Safety recommendations of Teams A, B, and C based on Wrong Patient case study
Team A Team B Team C
1.) A full review of systems
2.) Implementing safety briefing surgical pause 
handover
1.) Process for patient consent must be robust 
and unless completed procedure must be 
halted. This process should be audited
2.) Patient information systems must be able to 
share information
3.) Compatibility of systems needs to be 
reviewed
1.) Implementation of safety briefs to support 
the development of a safety culture
2.) Implementation of consent policy
Table 15  Safety recommendations (external analysis) on the wrong patient case incident
Safety recommendations
1. Patient identification
 a. Review of the organisational policy on positive patient identification to ensure it is adequate i.e. it contains clear instructions on triangulat-
ing a patient’s identification – ask the patient their name, DoB and what they understand they are here for
 b. Develop appropriate training materials (online?) for this purpose
 c. Implement a programme of mandatory training for all staff in patient-facing roles to ensure this is embedded in daily practice
2. Patient consent
 a. Review of the organisational policy on positive patient consent to ensure it is adequate i.e. it contains clear descriptions of informed and 
uninformed consent and includes “break glass” conditions for when it is not possible to obtain informed consent
 b. Develop appropriate training materials (online?) for this purpose
 c. Implement a programme of mandatory training for all staff in patient-facing roles to ensure this is embedded in daily practice
3. Clinical communication
 a. Review of the organisational policy on positive patient consent to ensure it is adequate i.e. it contains clear guidance on the mandatory 
information which should be relayed at any hand-over of a patient from one healthcare professional to another. This may benefit from the 
adoption of the SBAR approach – Situation, Background, Assessment, recommendation
 b. Develop appropriate training materials (online?) for this purpose
 c. Implement a programme of mandatory training for all staff in patient-facing roles to ensure this is embedded in daily practice
4. Computing systems
 a. Computer systems must be in sync within the hospital to be able to receive updated information regarding patient information
5. Culture of clinical hierarchy
 a. Review the organisational culture regarding any perceived clinical hierarchy and the abilities to challenge “upwards”, e.g. Nurse to Doctor, 
Jnr Doc to Consultant, etc
 b. Introduce a duty of candour into all clinical staff contracts so that individuals are duty-bound to report any concerns within a “just” culture, 
without fear of recrimination
 c. Training and support for the implementation of this would also be required and would need to be lead by the medical director
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to review their initial analyses, identify any missing infor-
mation regarding contributing factors not included in the 
diagram and refine their outcomes. This can be achieved as 
a formal process called intra-reliability where the AcciMap 
approach is applied again on the same incident by the same 
set of participants to compare if they produce consistent out-
comes (Goode et al. 2017).
Another limitation involves the nature of the case inci-
dent as has already been highlighted in this study. Producing 
accident case reports that carry comprehensive information 
on contributing factors not only about actions of individuals 
but also organisational and external factors are needed to 
identify system weaknesses. Lack of such information from 
this incident report used potentially contributed to the chal-
lenge of participants identifying contributing factors. One 
of the challenges of applying this type accident approach to 
case reports that do not contain detailed information from 
all socio-technical aspects of the healthcare system is that 
it can be difficult to identify systemic weaknesses that con-
tributed to human errors. This case incident was initially 
carried out using RCA techniques which do not allow for 
a deeper analysis of other factors that played a role. While 
this incident took place in the USA, it was also interesting 
to note from a few participants regarding how new this type 
of incident was to them as they have never experienced such 
type in their practices. This could have possibly contributed 
to how participants analysed the incident due to unfamiliar-
ity and how things work in UK health settings compared to 
their US counterparts.
AcciMap results produced from the teams also indicated 
that despite the number of participants per team, there were 
contrasting contributing factors identified at each Acci-
Map level. These differences can occur as a result of their 
understanding of the case study, contributing factors each 
team could agree on to be considered valid and determining 
appropriate levels and causal relationships. It was also chal-
lenging to conduct an immediate follow-up of the workshop 
with participants to further elaborate their reasonings behind 
their initial findings due to their commitments in respective 
boards and availability.
12  Conclusion
Based on survey data, comparative analyses of AcciMap 
results and discussions with participants, there was a gen-
eral appreciation of the benefits of adopting the AcciMap 
approach for incident investigations and analysis. Aspects 
of the usability of the approach including its ease of use, 
serving as a communication tool, and fostering team col-
laboration were positive for the participants. However, 
aspects relating to its ability to identify contributing fac-
tors relating to socio-technical aspects received generally 
mixed responses. The reason for this can be attributed to 
their understanding of the incident and the time restriction 
which may have prevented them from thoroughly reviewing 
their respective outcomes. Regarding the potential for the 
AcciMap approach to be adopted for incident analysis in 
clinical practices, a crucial aspect noted in the workshop was 
the AcciMap approach being time-consuming. This factor 
may have influenced how they regarded suitability of the 
AcciMap approach for accident investigations compared to 
their experience using RCA techniques. The ability to use 
the AcciMap approach for clinical investigations requires 
not only knowledge of the domain but also requires users to 
correctly apply the guidelines and where necessary, update 
the initial analysis to produce the final result. However, these 
processes can a considerable amount of time and effort, 
especially in a domain as complex as healthcare consider-
ing limited resources.
Aspects relating to reliability, and validity are also very 
important to practitioners for the approach to be considered a 
valuable toolkit. As was indicated in the focus group discus-
sion sub-section, a suggestion made by one of the partici-
pants regarding the grouping of contributing factors into dif-
ferent hierarchical headings suggests a need for developing 
a more structured approach of classifying contributing fac-
tors across different levels. As suggested in Waterson et al. 
(2017) regarding the evolution of the AcciMap approach, 
reliability and validity can be improved potentially by com-
bining with other existing techniques. Based on contributing 
factors (inferences) identified by participants at the organi-
sational and external levels, themes can be extracted from 
case reports that can allow an AcciMap approach specific 
to the health domain to be developed. Other aspects noted 
in their experience of using the AcciMap approach included 
the lack of incorporation of timelines and being able to use 
barrier analysis for determining existing barriers relating to 
contributing factors.
It is important to acknowledge that as of the time this 
workshop was conducted, the concept of systems thinking 
and approaches incorporating it was still relatively new. 
Since then, a growing number of NHS practices are gradu-
ally adopting systemic approaches for incident analysis. The 
AcciMap approach itself needs to be further explored as to 
how it can be further improved to be considered a valu-
able tool. The work of Salmon et al. (2017) achieved this 
through the development of a classification scheme based 
on the underlying AcciMap framework but specific to led 
outdoor activities. This approach is currently being applied 
in the development of a proposed health-specific AcciMap 
approach and will be evaluated with safety practitioners in 
NHS for its reliability and validity.







Before attending the introductory AcciMap training workshop
Q1.) Were you familiar with “systems thinking”? Yes [] No []
Q2.) Where you aware of the AcciMap method? Yes [] No []
Q3.) Had you previously used AcciMap method in your NHS board before? Yes [] No []
Questions on the use of AcciMaps
The following is a set of statements about using the AcciMap method. For each statement please say whether you:
[6] – Strongly agree
[5] – Agree
[4] – Slightly agree
[3] – Neutral
[2] – Slightly disagree
[1] – Disagree
[0] – Strongly disagree





Q4.) AcciMap is a suitable method for analysing 
accidents
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Q5.) AcciMap effectively describes the timeline of 
events leading to the accident
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Q6.) AcciMap effectively analyses the contributing 
factors to an accident from:
a) Technical components e.g. hardware, software [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
b) Human factors issues e.g. workload, fatigue [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
c) Organisational issues e.g. policies and procedures [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
d) Environmental issues e.g. climate and noise 
levels
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
e) External issues e.g. lack of oversight, budget 
allocation
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Q7.) AcciMap provides a comprehensive descrip-
tion of an accident
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Q8.) AcciMap effectively represents causal relation-
ships between each levels
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Q9.) AcciMap accurately identifies the causes of an 
accident
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Q10.) AcciMap can be applied to analyse any type 
of accident in NHS trust
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Q11.) AcciMap is an easy method to understand [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Q12.) The terms and concepts used in the AcciMap 
method are clear and unambiguous
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Q13.) It is easy to identify contributing factors that 
led to the accident
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Q14.) It is easy to identify unsafe decisions that led 
to the accident
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Q15.) AcciMap is an easy method to use for acci-
dent analysis
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Q16.) AcciMap is easy to use in a team-based 
analysis
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
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Q17.) AcciMap promotes team collaboration during 
analysis
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Q18.) AcciMap’s graphical diagram is a useful com-
munication tool
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Q19.) It would be easy for me to become skilled at 
using AcciMap method
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Q20.) AcciMap analysis can be completed in an 
acceptable timescale (within a few hours of the 
training workshop)
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Q21.) AcciMap method is time-consuming [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Q22.) I received sufficient introductory training in 
the use of the AcciMap method to effectively use 
this method
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Any other comments
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